Role of American Policy in the Palestinian Catastrophe between 1939-1948: Prevention of Palestine Independence and Creation of the Jewish State

دور السياسة الأمريكية في النكبة الفلسطينية بين عام ١٩٣٩ـ١٩٤٨: منع الاستقلال الفلسطيني وخلق دولة يهودية

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Abstract

This research investigates the American policy role in contributing to the Palestinian catastrophe by helping to create a Jewish state in Palestine in 1948. It defines the domestic American and international factors which affected the US policy on Palestine, and how it reflected on the American national interests in the Middle East. It discusses the American institutional participation in policy decision-making where the Zionists and their supporters played specific roles in defending the Jewish demands in Palestine. This work shows that they used their positions in the executive and legislative branches of government to create homogeneous American-Zionist interests to unify their activities in the US, foreign countries and the United Nations. It studies the development of the US-British cooperation with Zionism and its impact on the status of Palestine. These aspects of the research will also be analyzed by the use of historical methodology to find out the reasons responsible for the persistence of the US in taking a pro-Zionist stand in the face of Palestinian-Arab opposition. The findings of the research show that

Zionism utilized the shared Western historical development and the common cultural basis to direct the American policy toward serving the Zionist interest in Palestine as an American interest, which put American and Arab interests in a lengthy conflict. The significance of this research lies within its emphasis on studying the American policy on Palestine during its most crucial period that witnessed the Palestinian catastrophe with establishing a foreign Zionist entity in 1948.

ملخص

يستقصي هذا البحث دور السياسة الأمريكية في المساهمة بالمأساة الفلسطينية، وذلك في المساعدة بخلق دوله يهودية في فلسطين في عام ١٩٤٨. ويحدد العناصر الأمريكية الداخلية والدولية التي تؤثر في اتجاه السياسة الأمريكية اتجاه فلسطين وكيف انعكست على المصالح الأمريكية في الشرق الأوسط. ويناقش هذا البحث مشاركة المؤسسات الأمريكية في صنع القرار السياسي الذي من خلاله لعب الصهاينة ومؤيدوهم أدوارًا محددةً في الدفاع عن المطالب اليهودية في فلسطين. ويبين هذا البحث أنهم استغلوا مراكزهم في السلطة التنفيذية والتشريعية للحكومة بخلق مصلحة أمريكية – صهيونية مشتركة لتوحيد نشاطاتهم في الولايات المتحدة، والدول الأجنبية والأمم المتحدة. ويدرس تطور التعاون الأمريكي - الإنجليزي مع الصهيونية وأثره على وضع فلسطين. استخدم البحث المنهجية التاريخية لكشف الأسباب المسئولة عن مواصلة الولايات المتحدة في اتخاذ موقف داعم للصهيونية في مواجهة المعارضة الفلسطينية – العربية. كشف البحث أن الصهيونية استخدمت التطور التاريخي الغربي المشترك والقاعدة الثقافية المشتركة لتوجه السياسة الأمريكية نحو خدمة المصلحة الصهيونية في فلسطين كمصلحة أمريكية الأمر الذي وضع المصالح الأمريكية والعربية في صراع طويل. تكمن أهمية هذا البحث بتركيزه على دراسة السياسة الأمريكية في فلسطين خلال أكثر حقبها خطورة والتي شهدت النكبة الفلسطينية بإقامة الكيان الصهيوني الغريب في ١٩٤٨م.

Introduction

The American involvement in Palestine started since mid-nineteenth century with humanitarian aid to the Jews under the Ottoman rule, which later on turned into a form of a pro-Zionist political support, starting from the British occupation of Palestine in 1917 until the end of the British mandate which resulted in the creation of a Jewish state and the Palestinian catastrophe in 1948. Such involvement gave a helping hand to Zionism and Britain, forced the Palestinian people lose their country, and eventually turned their country to a place of conflict destroying

regional and international interests. The United States (US) used its humanitarian sensibility for imperialist interests in World affairs. Robert H. Ferrell pointed out that, since the mid-nineteenth century America was destined to compete with European powers, for Westernization and Eastern markets, with the sense of a superior Anglo-Saxon race (1).

The US extended its protection to a disgruntled small Jewish community, with some European Jews (Ashkenazi), in Palestine under the Turkish rule. The Jews were considered Westerners to be salvaged from Turkish mistreatment. Under the capitulation treaty of 1830 with Turkey, the US intervened on behalf of Jews through humanitarian assistance. It gave the Jews charity (Haluka) and pressured the Turkish authorities not to restrict Jewish immigration from Russia, following the assassination of the Alexander II in 1881. The American involvement began taking political shape when the American Minister to Constantinople, Oscar S. Straus, agreed with the head of Zionism, Herzl, that Palestine must receive Jewish immigrants without Turkish opposition (2). By the beginning of the twentieth century, Zionism was gaining strength in America. Jewish organizations, like the B'nai Brith worked for the colonization of Palestine with Congressional and Presidential support (3). However, Zionism gained further strength by establishing the Provincial Executive Committee for Zionist Affairs in 1914 by the known American Zionist, Louis Brandies, in 1914, who could draw the attention of educated Jews and make plans for the colonization of Palestine (4).

The political turning point in the American policy towards the Jews was when the US approved the issued-British Balfour Declaration of 1917 to establish a Jewish homeland in Palestine. President Wilson informed the British Government and his Zionist friend, Stephen Wise, of the US formal acceptance of it (5). He was, for religious reasons, so enthusiastic about the British promise and did not even, in the words of Hamdan Hamdan, who wrote about the roots of the Israeli state, want to consult with the State Department or the Congress about such major event (6). Wilson told Brandies that he wanted to participate in fulfilling the Biblical prophecy of bringing back the Jews to Palestine (7). The

Palestinians were not part of his mental set-up and ignored the many centuries of Arab-Islamic rule of Palestine, a view that went against his principle of self-determination promised to colonized people to be fulfilled at the end of World War One (8). Also his successor, President Warren G. Harding, adopted a pro-Zionist line when he supported on September 22, 1922 the joint Lodge-Fish Congressional resolution (9). Further American support followed by accepting the British mandate on Palestine given by the League of Nations in order to fulfill the promise of that British declaration. This American commitment to Zionism was integrated into the Anglo-American treaty of 1924, by which no modification of the mandate would be done without an American consent (10). In the meanwhile, the US State Department was viewing American interests from a global balance of power, which advocated a pro-Arab position for the multiple American interests in the Arab countries (11). The British Declaration became the point of reference to all consequent political decisions the US undertook regarding the Palestine conflict. Ever since, it became also a source of policy confusion, plaguing American decision-makers in trying to serve American national interests in the Middle East. The Balfour Declaration automatically put the American policy hostage to British-Zionist interests.

The US was bolder in supporting Zionism with the coming of the anti-Jewish Nazi party to power in Germany in the 1930s. This coincided with the inauguration of the American President Frankiln Roosevelt in 1932, who like President Wilson had Christian upbringing, which led him to support Jewish return to Palestine as a standard American policy. With the beginning of his tenure, many Jews started to leave Germany for Palestine in order to strengthen the justification for a Jewish state there since the Roosevelt-Zionist alliance was already deepening. He strongly supported Brandies' Zionist Organization of America and appointed Brandies' friend, Judge Felix Frankfurter to the Supreme Court in 1939 (12). The depth of Roosevelt-Zionist relations could be illustrated by the percentage of Jewish votes given to this president, reaching 82% in 1932, 85%, in 1936, 90%, in 1940 and 90% in 1944 (13). More American support came from the US Congress which

rejected, in the face of State Department opposition, the British White Papers of the 1930 and 1939 which called for restricting the Jewish immigration and land purchase in Palestine. In 1937, the Zionists became more daring in pressuring the Congress to support the British Peel Commission of partitioning Palestine between the Jews and the Palestinians so as to pave the way for a Jewish state, following the Palestinian revolt of 1936 (14). Obviously, this American-Zionist agreement of policy was in direct contradiction with the rising Palestinian nationalism which sought an independent Palestine, free of political dominance from the Jewish minority. According to the League of Nations mandate article 22, the Turkish liberated areas including Palestine were given the right for independence after a certain period. The Palestinian drive for independence became evident since the fall of king Faisal Ibn al-Hussein's government of Syria in July 1920, (15) and more apparent with the Palestinian revolt of 1936 (16).

Bureaucratic disagreements within the American government about the validity of supporting the Zionist project in Palestine appeared more glaring in the Second World War of 1939; thus, stemming from a need for Arab allies against Germany. Zionism was seen by the State and War Departments strategists, as inimical to American national interests in the Middle East and Europe. The Arab contribution to the Allied war efforts in oil and strategic location were vital to victory over Germany. In April 1941, the Executive branch was met by Congressional pro-Zionist activities through setting up the American-Palestine Committee of sixty-eight Senators and two-hundred Representatives, which aimed at separating the President policy from that of the State Department, and urged him to commit himself to the Zionist goal of a state, on the basis of the Balfour Declaration and the mandate, especially, in view of the Nazi pressures on the Jews (17). In response, the State Department suggested, entrusting Palestine to Muslims, Christians and Jews, under a British trusteeship to end the mandate, and as a way of getting rid of the Balfour Declaration. Since this project was rejected by the Zionists and the Arabs, it was suggested by Colonel Halford Hoskin, to make Palestine a bi-national state within Syrian federation. At the same time, President

Roosevelt tried to get King Ibn-Saud to accept the settling of Jews in Palestine. When he failed, Roosevelt assured Ibn-Saud that nothing will be done in Palestine, without consultation with Arabs and Jews (18). Roosevelt was, subtly and vainly, trying to reconcile conflicting Palestinian-Jewish interests with the State Department help against public Congressional support for the Jews.

Roosevelt's line of policy was to be completed by his successor President Harry Truman, who carried the American commitment of Balfour Declaration to a completion. During his Senate years, he was a pro-Zionist, who voted for a Jewish homeland in Palestine in the Palestine Resolution of January 1944 (19). As a President under Zionist influence for election considerations and emotional support of the Jewish refugees in Germany, he pressured Britain to allow immigration to Palestine (20). In doing so, he was going against the State and War Departments' advice, of not jeopardizing American interests in the Arab World by pushing them to the Soviet Camp. With Congressional support, he joined Britain to introduce partition as a solution to the Palestinian problem in the United Nations in 1947. This was a step that led to the creation of Israel in 1948 and to his first recognition of it; simultaneously causing the Palestinian depopulation of Palestine for Jewish expansion. This, however, was a culmination of a long policy, which went against American interests and ideals of freedom, justice and happiness, seen as inalienable rights of all people and guaranteed by the American constitution.

The previous discussion outlined the research problem, with the American foreign policy, as the independent variable, and the Palestinian catastrophe of 1948, as the dependent variable. The research problem was based on the main assumption that the American policy toward Palestine, before, through, and after, the Second World War, was a subject of dispute, in the name of national interests among different American decision-makers; i.e., in the Executive and Legislative branches, and among influential figures in society. This opened the way for advancing the Zionist interest of creating Israel, with an international acceptance despite a stiff Palestinian resistance that could not prevent the

Palestinian catastrophe 1948, a paradox which created an indefinitely unstable political environment for American interests in the Middle East. The more there was an American policy dispute concerning Palestine, the more the Zionists used it to isolate their opponents, to further their own interests, to increase the Palestinian resistance, and to create an antagonistic environment for the US interests in the Middle East region.

In the period between 1939-1948-49 this assumption covered the subject of studying the American policy role in causing the Palestinian catastrophe and creating Israel which came in direct contradiction to the independence of Palestine. The study covers the shortcomings of literature, especially since previous researchers at the expense of research integrity, focused on selected policy aspects, to satisfy their concerns, which produced half-truths about relations between the American policy and the Palestinian catastrophe at the expense of research objectivity.

For available literature on the subject, the research pitfalls could be seen in the book by Joseph B. Schechtman: the United States and the Jewish State Movement, the Crucial Decade: 1939-1949 (New York: Herzl Press, 1966). The author studied a short period of the Palestinian affairs in which Zionism preoccupied his main concern. His arguments are apologetic for the Zionist plan for a Jewish state with British support and American connivance. Schechtman deliberately underestimated the value of American interests in the Arab World during the Second World War and considered them good only for the duration of the war. American support for the Jewish state competed with American long standing interest in the Arab oil which to this author should have been more paramount to American decision–makers. His methodology of selective deduction of carefully gathered data on certain events turned the book into a defending record of the Zionist aggression against the defenseless Palestinian people under the British mandate.

Similar in its limited scope, but richer in analyses, and somewhat balanced toward the Palestinians and the Zionists, was the book by Martin Jones, Failure in Palestine: British and United States Policy after the Second World War (London and New York: Mansell Publishing Limited, 1986). The author provides comparative analyses of the British

and the American policies on Palestine between 1945 and 1948. Detailed discussion of what he called the British–American policy collapse was attributed to the devolution of responsibility to the United Nations, where they collaborated to impose a biased solution on the Palestinian people. The weakness of the book was in not giving equal importance, to thoroughly studying the historical development of the American policy on the Palestinian issue.

The tendency to give less emphasis to historical roots of the political events was also shown by Mohammed K. Shadid in his book: The United States and the Palestinians (London: Croom Helm, 1981). Shadid briefly touched on the American policy toward the Palestinian people prior to 1948. His emphasis was on describing the policy–making rather than systematically analyzing its role in setting the process of shaping the Palestinian dispersion.

The literature weakness in emphasizing the Palestinian affairs characterized the book by Robert W. Stookey: America and the Arab States: An Uneasy Encounter (New York: John Wiley and Sons, Inc., 1975). Stookey discusses American interests in the Middle East with little connection to Palestine. Other literature is one-sided about dealing with the Palestinian situation in the sense that it sees the conflict from the Zionist point of view. Yonathan Shapiro's book: Leadership of the American Zionist Organization, 1897-1930 (Chicago: University of Illinois press, 1971) talks wholly about the American Zionist leadership. He focuses on the competition between American and European Zionism in garnering American support to colonize Palestine. Another Zionist view was represented by Ben Halpern, The Idea of the Jewish State (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 1961). The author traces back the creation of Israel to European Zionism. He connects the Zionist success in establishing a Jewish state to the European–American help as an end-process of the Balfour Declaration. On the Palestinian side, Mohammed Y. Muslih in The Origins of Palestinian Nationalism (New York: Columbia university press, 1988) speaks of the Palestinian nationalist development in the late nineteenth century under the Ottoman rule, as part of Arab, especially, Syrian nationalism throughout the

British rule of Palestine. The book is useful in covering the issue of Palestinian nationalism, but it fails to connect it with the American policy in the Middle East. The Palestinian nationalism is covered more extensively by William B. Quandt, et al., in <u>The Politics of Palestinian Nationalism</u> (Los Angeles: The University of California press, 1973). The authors investigate the rise of the Palestinian national movement in reaction to the Zionist–British collaboration through the Balfour Declaration and the British mandate. The Palestinian nationalism grew stronger with the growth of the Jewish presence and the British repression until 1947, when it began weakening with the partition of Palestine and collapsing with the creation of Israel by a strong American support.

The most detailed book discussing the American policy in Palestine was written by Frank E. Manuel, <u>The Realities of American–Palestine Relations</u> (Washington, D.C.: Public Affairs press, 1949). The author gives detailed account of the American policy with respect to the Palestinian issue from the mid-nineteenth century till the creation of Israel. Also, Reuben Fink's book<u>: America and Palestine</u> (New York: American Zionist Emergency Council, 1944) provides rich documents about American and British policies regarding the Palestinian conflict.

Since none of the books, except Manuel's, investigate the American role in the Palestinian catastrophe methodology of other writers falls short of satisfying the research curiosity for the truth. Although a scholar may not be able to escape his subjectivity, he/she must not prejudice the truth to justify American interests from a Zionist point of view, leading to the Palestinian national destruction. For instance, Manuel skews the historical analyses of the subject to blur the truth about the injustice done to the Palestinian people as they lost their country. Manual counts events according to his liking, which determines the outcome of his work in advance. The purpose of this work is to utilize historical methodology by connecting events, and following them up to their logical conclusion. It is intended to study decisions and actions, taken by the US on Palestine, to see how they affect the Palestinian future. Hence, the American policy is perceived as the independent variable and the Palestinian catastrophe

as the dependent variable. Light is shed on both variables by primary and secondary sources. There is a direct link between the Palestinian catastrophe and the American policy between 1939 and-1948-49. In spite of the political squabble between the American executive and legislative branches, which sometimes prevented or delayed the American support for Zionism; frequent American decisions were taken in various policy phases, to sustain a steady flow of actions in support of the Zionist national goals in Palestine, thus providing Zionism with the political and financial aid, on humanitarian basis, under the Ottoman rule, and political support under the British mandate, leading to the creation of Israel. Relatively speaking, there was a contradiction between the American support of Zionism as a Western movement, and the Palestinian national drive for independence from the British rule. The interrelationship between the Palestinian nationalism, on the one hand, and Zionism and the US, on the other, and with the Nazi Germany as another factor, transformed them to a higher level of conflict in the 1930s and 1940s. More American aid to the Zionists drew more Palestinian resistance to Zionism, seen as an imperialist tool in the hands of the Americans and the British. Thus, through the historical analysis, we could understand the American policy role as an independent variable, with its value aspects of big and small involvement in the Palestinian catastrophe, its regional and international aspects of developing a crisis, its impact of costing the Palestinians their country, and its short-run and long-run effect on American interests in the region.

A clear understanding of the topic required answering the following questions: Given the American domestic and the international conditions, why and how did America get involved in Palestine? What implications did its involvement on the side of Zionism have for the Palestinian people and its national interests in the Middle East region? What role did the policy of the American executive and legislative branches play in affecting the future of Palestine? Was the American approval of the Balfour Declaration the source of increasing support for the Zionist national goals at the expense of the Palestinian people? Did the Palestinian resistance to Zionism affect the American–Zionist relations?

What was the American role in enlisting the World support for a Jewish state in Palestine? Did the creation of Israel entail a Palestinian catastrophe and what was its impact on the American standing in the region?

Finding answers to these questions was the aim of this research, as the literature on the subject failed to give conclusive answers. Therefore, the significance of this work was to compensate for the scarcity of literature, and with its comprehensive discussion, it contributed to the understanding of the American foreign policy on Palestine in the most dramatic period of its modern history. This research also determined precisely the American policy role in helping to cause the Palestinian catastrophe of 1948-49. The American political–economic support of Zionism gradually enabled the Jews to force the Palestinian people out of their country. Without the American support, Zionism could not have won an international support at the UN, for a Jewish state on the basis of an American-approved Balfour Declaration and a British mandate.

Theoretical Perspective

United States Rising Power in World Affairs and its Impact on American Interests in the Middle East\Palestine between 1939 and 1949.

Unlike the pre-First World War of 1914-18 and its aftermath, the US came out of its isolation to get heavily involved in the World affairs a decade before the Second World War of 1939-45 and thereafter. Being the largest capitalist economy, it had to compete with European powers, among which, Germany took a leading position to threaten the dominant Anglo-Saxon powers of Britain and the US in the World arena. The Middle East became a hot theater of major powers conflicting interests over its riches. At center, lied Palestine with its unique place in human civilization, to become through foreign intervention, a land of danger to World peace. With its political bias toward Zionism, the US gradually helped prepare the ground for a destructive international conflict. It did so, by endorsing the Balfour Declaration issued by Britain in 1917 to establish a Jewish homeland in Palestine. Even though, America

reverted to isolationism in 1918, (21) it worked for the implementation of the Declaration. It also accepted its integration into the British mandate on Palestine in 1921 thus fulfilling its promise. The American political and economic aid was provided to Zionism throughout the 1920s and 1930s, until America intervened in World affairs on the British side against Germany, in the War for the second time, in 1939 (22). During the War, America pressured Britain to allow Jewish immigration and purchasing of land in Palestine. Even America became the main arena of the Zionist activities to partition Palestine.

By the end of war in 1945, the American policy entered the phase of containing the Soviet Union as the main threat to the West. A cold war started between the two super powers for the World dominance (23). Even though American interests, as during the war, required satisfying the Arab/Palestinian side, the US tilted toward Zionism under Jewish pressure in Congress to partition Palestine. America, under such pressure, succeeded in securing the World support for establishing Israel in 1948.

The American Congress became the hot-bed of Zionist intrigues and propaganda through the use of Jewish vote and money for electing Congressmen. These were the means to tempt or threaten Congressmen, in favor of the Zionist scheme in Palestine. The executive branch, especially the President, was deeply affected by Congressional influence in taking a pro-Zionist policy. The Congress was instrumental in seeking the American support for the Balfour Declaration, British mandate, Jewish immigration, partition of Palestine and recognition of Israel in 1948. In the process, the Palestinian side was ignored for lacking comparable influence on American decision-makers. Against the Congress, the State and War Departments, in the executive branch, vainly tried to consider the Palestinian right on a legitimate American strategic necessity. The two departments were often skirted by pro-Zionist Presidents because of Jewish influence in government and society (24).

With Congressional strong hold on American policy toward Palestine and with a pro-Zionist policy, it was inevitable to jeopardize American interests in the Middle East. America developed cultural, economic,

political and military interests in the region, before and after the advent of Zionism. Palestine and its surroundings received a special American attention for their importance in human civilization, and vast resources of the Arab lands. In the next part, the researcher would discus the impact of the American policy on the promotion of American interests in Palestine and the Middle East.

United States Policy Impact on American National Interests in the Middle-East and Palestine before 1948.

Since the eighteenth century, American missionaries and laymen invested in establishing educational and trade centers in the Arab World. They became places for spreading American values and ideas as the basis of relations with the Arab people, including Palestinians. Among the centers of interest was Jerusalem for its religious significance, which brought Americans to reside there in 1873. Prior to this date, they established the Syrian Protestant College, known as the American University of Beirut in 1866. Other centers were the Palestinian port of Jaffa, and Alexandria in Egypt, with Beirut and several Middle Eastern cities, witnessing American activities, under the Ottoman rule in late eighteenth century (25). The American cultural and trade interests expanded every where in Arab countries, throughout the nineteenth and twentieth century. Americans played a special role in sustaining humanitarian, scientific and technical ties with the Arab people. Many Americans visited for religious purposes Palestine and the Middle East. Others came for strategic discoveries of the Jordan River, as did Lieutenant William Francis Lynch in 1847 (26). Moreover, America competed with other European powers for a strong position in Palestine as a link between the Sea and the lands of Asia and Africa.

Palestine was to be factored in growing American interests in the Middle East, especially those of oil, which became in the twentieth century, vital to its security and commerce. Military planners were preoccupied with oil, as a death and life matter. This was signified by one of the American delegates to the 1919 peace conference, Captain Yale William, who insisted on the American control of oil in the region. Captain Yale spoke of "the extreme importance to the American nation

of maintaining a strong position in the petroleum trade of the world…, our national safety, the maintenance and expansion of our foreign and domestic trade, must depend to a large extent upon the assurance to the United States of continued supplies of petroleum. With our requirements currently increasing, with our own supplies about to decline…, the necessity of guaranteeing now to American industry the right to have its part in the development of the petroleum resources about to pass under British control will be apparent" (27). For oil importance, America forced its allies through the mandate to accept American partnership of oil, as it had a dominant role between the two wars (28). Oil became of a pressing need to America during the Second War, and its security, required an American pro-Arab policy in Palestine. President Roosevelt promised King Ibn-Saud of Arabia not to change the status quo of Palestine behind Arab back (29).

Roosevelt's assurance regarding Palestine was part of an American endeavor to serve historical security interests in the Middle East. In spite of its neutrality in World affairs, since the First World War, America realized the strategic importance of the Arab region. The Arab military role through the Sheriff Hussein revolt with Britain was crucial against Turkey and Germany in 1916. Therefore, Securing the Arab military support required an American-British understanding of Arab interests in Palestine. This was obvious in reports of the famous British agent, Thomas E. Lawrence, and the American author William Yale in the Middle East. They reported their worries of an Arab reversal against the Allies if Palestine was to become Jewish. Zionism was seen as an obstacle to American-British military strategists in the region (30).

In the post First World War, the American strategic interests grew stronger, till they reached a maximum level during the Second World War. German and Soviet powers competed for influence in the Middle East at the expense of the US and Britain. The Arab factor played a role in the American strategic planning against Nazism and communism. The US had to maintain military bases and secure oil supplies in Saudi Arabia as vital for Western prosperity. The need for bases and oil took first priority in the post-1945 cold war with the Soviet Union. An American-

Arab alliance was needed to curb the Soviet drive in the area (31). Yet Zionism stood in the way of building secure American interests against the advancing Soviet influence in the region.

The Zionist intrusion in Palestine worked against the American interests of spreading democracy and peace in the Middle East. Zionism was an imperialist movement created by Britain to serve British imperial interests, which contradicted the American ideal of freedom. Playing on history and Jewish persecution, Zionism was able to command a strong American support for its plan of establishing a Jewish state in Palestine. The American recognition of Balfour Declaration put the US on a collision course with the Arab World, where vast American cultural, commercial and military interests were located. It also generated a conflict of interests with other powers which created a continuous tension in the region.

Until the end of First World War, the Arabs had faith in America as a neutral power working for the freedom of colonized people. The Arab high opinion of America was expressed by the British agent Lawrence, who acknowledged that the Arabs believed in the American honest political role, as opposed to the chicanery of Britain and France (32). Hence, it was a high priority for Britain and the Zionists to succeed in implicating America in the Balfour Declaration to separate it from the Arab side. Gradually, America was taking the Zionist direction, as seen in the endorsement of the Balfour Declaration, the mandate, and the British-American treaty of 1924, thus guaranteeing the American participation in the fate of Palestine, which reached a maximum in the 1940s. The American advocacy of Zionist claims in Palestine raised the Arab disappointment with the American role in the region.

Not only was Palestine reversed to the British-Zionist influence, but also the American economic and military interests suffered as a result. Britain denied the US oil exploration right in Palestine after the First World War. The Jewish dominance of Palestine was negatively perceived by American strategists, like the vice-Admiral Robert B. Cavney who said it would bring future Soviet intervention in the region (33).

The Zionist influence in the American government carried with it the ever- present danger of the American military involvement in the Middle East, a factor which was not in the best interest of maintaining the World peace. Yet, such influence made America stand for partitioning Palestine to create Israel, and protect it by force when necessary. Hence, Israel became a fixed feature of the cold war between the US and the Soviet Union. At the same time, the Palestinian people were sacrificed for Zionist gains from the East-West competition. Turning the Palestinians to masses of refugees established the basis for continued war in Palestine, which threatened the World peace. This is exactly what the Assistant Secretary of State, George Mchghee warned against when he said that "As long as the refugee problem remains unresolved, attainment of a political settlement in Palestine is delayed… and the refugees…will continue to serve as a national focal point for exploitation by Communist and disruptive elements which neither we nor the Near Eastern governments can afford to ignore…whose discontent increases with the passage of time, is the greatest threat to security of the area which now exists" (34). The Zionist influenced-American policy also antagonized the Arab nationalism by forcing it to militate on the side of the communist radicalism, which Israel used as a plausible justification to perpetrate the Palestinian dispersion.

Before their destruction in 1948, the Palestinian people had the social structure to constitute a country and the land was populated with infrastructure and was developing, as Zionism began invading Palestine under British protection. According to the League of Nations and the United Nations Charters, the Palestinian people were entitled to political independence like other colonized people. Instead, the imperialist rivalry between major power and Zionist collaboration all led to a catastrophe, which the US policy was an obvious agent in bringing about.

American Support for Jewish National Home against Palestinian Self-determination during the Second World War.

The increasing number of Jews emigrating from Germany to Palestine in the 1930s strengthened the dynamics of building a Jewish state there. This was the motif behind partitioning Palestine by the

British Peel Commission of 1937, in response to the Palestinian revolution which called for national independence in 1936. While Palestinians rejected the partition, the Zionists accepted it in principle, but not as defined by that commission (35). The partition was a land mark success to bring the Balfour Declaration closer to implementation, which was a common goal of Zionism, Britain and the US. For the US, partition was a point of departure to push further in the direction of enabling Zionism to achieve its strategic aim of becoming part of the physical scene of Palestine and the Middle East. Along this line, America rejected the 1939 White Paper of suspending the Jewish immigration, land purchase and making Palestine a unitary state for Palestinians and Jews together. There was a joint campaign between Zionist and Congressional leaders to put pressure on President Roosevelt to reject the British White Paper of 1939. They perceived it as contradicting item seven of the 1924-agreement, which stipulated taking the American view regarding any change in the mandate policy (36). Zionist leaders exerted die-hard efforts in pressuring the American government to reverse the seemingly anti-Zionist White Paper of 1939, though it was not of concrete results to the Palestinians. Yet, the State Department argued that neither the Congressional statement of 1922 which represented personal view, nor the 1924 agreement which was of economic purpose, obliged the US to intervene on behalf of Zionism (37). But different American Zionist organizations pressed ahead and united in 1939 under the American Emergency Committee for Zionist Affairs (renamed in 1943 as the Zionist Emergency Committee), chaired by Rabbi S. Wise in 1939, to lobby American decision-makers behind the partition option (38). It collaborated with the American Palestine Committee composed of Congressmen and society figures to pass governmental resolutions favorable to Zionism. Under Zionist pressure, the Congress protested the 1939-White Paper throughout the war urging Britain to abide by the Balfour Declaration. A Congressional resolution in March 1942 stated the sentiment that " Faced as we are by the fact that the Nazi government, in its Jewish policy, is attempting to exterminate a whole people, we declare that, when the war is over it shall be common purpose…to right this cruel wrong…and above all, to enable large

numbers of the survivors to reconstruct their lives in Palestine where the Jewish people may once more assume a position of dignity and equality among the peoples of the earth…our Government may be assured that in continuing the traditional American policy in favor of so just a cause, it can rely upon our individual support" (39). This was typical of Congress, the rock-bed of the Zionist support in the US. By contrast, the State Department as worrying about the Middle East political stability remained adamantly opposed to the Zionist plan in Palestine. President Roosevelt quietly favored the Congressional line against that of the State Department.

With the American political need and the Nazi persecution of Jews playing in their favor, the Zionists shifted focus to demand a Jewish state in all Palestine. This was decided in the Baltimore conference of May 1942, in which Ben-Gurion, the head of the Palestine Jewish Community replaced Weisman as a leader, the conference tipped the balance in American Zionist hands. The conference drew on the idea of partition as the most realistic solution (40). The Zionist demands for a state gained sympathy from an America that was by then, at war against Germany for few months.

The idea of a Jewish state was gaining currency in the American political circles since the beginning of the 1940s. Between 1940 and 43, President Roosevelt worked privately and jointly, with the British and the Zionists to step-side the Palestinian leadership, by engaging Arab leaders for a settlement in Palestine. Roosevelt took it upon himself to convince King Ibn-Saud of Weisman's proposal to sell Palestine to the Zionists for twenty million Sterling. Ibn-Saud rejected the proposal, then Roosevelt tried to evoke the king's emotions of the Jewish plight in Germany, to which the king said, it was German responsibility. Roosevelt and Ibn-Saud reached an understanding that Palestine's fate would not be determined without consulting the Arabs ahead of time (41).

Roosevelt was following a rational course of policy with Ibn-Saud and other Arab nationalists whose friendship was crucial to face expanding German troops in Europe and North-Africa, especially after the defeat of France in 1940. The German influence was considerable in

Syria, Lebanon, Palestine and Egypt, where the strategic Suez Canal was to remain in British hands.   The American forces landed in Morocco in 1942, where Roosevelt met the Prime Minister Churchill to coordinate war plans against German troops occupying Tunisia. Furthermore, the Arab friendship, like that of Ibn-Saud was invaluable for sending supplies through the Arab Gulf to the Soviet Union under Hitler attack. As valuable as strategic interests were, oil interests in Arabia, were also of economic and military value for the war efforts. Based on the Navy demand, the American Aramco company increased oil production for the war machines, and built an oil pipeline from Syria to the Mediterranean. Moreover, they increased the financial support for Ibn-Saud to cover government expenditure; besides extending the American lend-lease assistance to him (42).

At the time of pursuing American interests in the Arab world, Roosevelt did not give up the Jewish state concept, but shelved it until the end of war since Palestine was more of a British concern. However, Britain had a secret partition plan of Palestine in 1943. This plan was against the White Paper of 1939 (43). The Palestinian self-determination was further vitiated by the Roosevelt proposal of internationalizing Palestine. The State Department picked up his scheme in October 1943 to advocate a council of nine, six Christians, two Muslims, and one Jew according to their numbers worldwide. It was followed with another proposal by the presidential assistant, Harry L. Hopkins, of a bi-national state in Palestine as a part of Syrian federation. The two proposals were dropped as rejected by both Palestinians and Jews (44).

The executive policy confusion was sustained by a firm congressional rejection of the Palestinian self-determination in favor of a Jewish state. The Wagner-Taft Congressional joint resolution was taken in January 1944 Saying: "Resolved that the United States shall use its good offices and take appropriate measures to the end that the doors of Palestine shall be opened for free entry of Jews into that country, and that there shall be full opportunity for colonization so that the Jewish people may ultimately reconstitute Palestine as a free and democratic Jewish commonwealth" (45). This was a complete negation of the 1939-White

Paper to affirm a Jewish self-determination at a time of impending German defeat.

The Congressional resolution had Roosevelt's approval against the State and War Departments advice. He allowed two Zionist leaders, Wise and Silver, to state on his behalf that the American government did not accept the 1939-White Paper, but stood firmly for establishing a Jewish national home in Palestine, urgently needed under the German persecution of Jews (46). Further commitment to the Zionist cause, was made by Roosevelt's approval of the Democratic Party convention in summer 1944, supporting a Jewish commonwealth in Palestine. He said that"…the Jewish people have worked and prayed for the establishment of Palestine as a free and democratic Jewish commonwealth…if reelected, I will help bring about its realization" (47).

His Zionist commitment was maintained as he practiced duplicity with the Arab side. He was following since 1933 a double standard policy in imitation of the British policy since the beginning of the First World War, which perpetuated the Zionist gains in Palestine. When Roosevelt met Ibn-Saud in February 1945, the first assured the second that nothing would be done in Palestine without consulting with the Arabs. However, consulting them did not mean abrogating his commitment to establishing a Jewish state in Palestine; believing it would be a blissful event to the Arabs who would finally accept its creation (48). And if the Arabs rejected it, the UN would create a Jewish state with an international protection (49). Roosevelt sought Soviet support for a Zionist state in February 1945-Yalta conference through Joseph Stalin, who seemed benign toward Zionism. Yet, Palestine, as an intricate problem, was not part of the agenda to be discussed by the Allies with the war continuing against the Axis (50).

Until his death on April 12, 1945, Roosevelt remained committed to the Zionist cause while he was placating the Arabs. He kept the Zionist dream alive with possibilities to be implemented, while giving messages to the Arabs of not changing the status quo of Palestine without their consultation. This intriguing line of policy was expressed in a letter to Ibn-Saud on April 5, 1945 stating: "…that the US attitude, in accordance

with earlier promises, was that no decision be taken with respect to the basic situation…without full consultation with both Arabs and Jews" (51).

From beginning to end of the war, Roosevelt was buying time to create conditions leading to a Jewish state in Palestine. In the US, the Zionist leaders were allowed to succeed in repelling the British restrictions of Jewish immigration and land purchase to fulfill the Balfour Declaration. Roosevelt and the Zionists acted collaboratively in disregard to the Palestinian self-determination. Roosevelt's supportive policy instigated the Jews to immigrate illegally to form a majority with a claim for political independence in Palestine. The continued Jewish immigration to Palestine vindicated the Arab fear of becoming minority which would threaten the future of Palestine as an Arab country. In fact, by 1945, the Arab population represented 67% of the overall population, while the Jews were 33%, these percentages changed very much from the year 1918, when the Arabs were 93% of the population and the Jews composed only 6%. The disparity between numbers of Arabs and Jews in Palestine widened greatly with increasing Jewish immigration by American-British support (52). With their number increasing, the Jewish claim to Palestine was getting stronger, and the US found it more pressing to create a Jewish state by partitioning the country. President Truman played a special role in finalizing the Zionist drive for a state, which will be the topic of discussion in the next part.

American Policy between 1945-1948 Leading to Palestinian Catastrophe and Its Impact on American Interests in the Middle East.

American-British Collaboration to End Palestine Conflict.

In April 1945, President Truman inherited from Roosevelt the task of putting to practice the Zionist plan for establishing a Jewish state in Palestine. The new executive was even bolder in taking measures affecting the Palestinian future, which the rising American-Soviet cold war gave additional momentum, to the process of fulfilling a promise to help the Zionists have their own state in Palestine. Even, when he was a

Senator, Truman supported the Wagner-Taft resolution of 1944, he said that "My sympathy, of course, is with the Jewish people and I am of the opinion that a resolution such of this should be very circumspectly handled until we know just exactly where we are going and why…I am willing to help make the fight for a Jewish Homeland in Palestine" (53). Such statement showed his firm determination to create a political environment favoring the Zionist national aims in the Arab land.

A favorable political environment meant, among other things, collaborating with Britain to open Palestine for Jewish immigration. For this purpose, Truman, as a President, communicated to the British Prime-Minister, Winston Churchill, the following: "I venture to express to you the hope that the British Government may find it possible without delay to take steps into Palestine…I hope … that you can arrange at your earliest convenience to let me have your ideas on the settlement of the Palestine problem, so that we can at a later but not too distant date discuss the problem in concrete terms" (54). Another letter to the same effect was sent to Churchill's successor, Premier C. R. Attlee, in September 1945, urging him to allow 100,000 Jews into Palestine from Germany. Attlee called for a less objectionable immigration policy to the Arabs than such a high number at once (55). Truman was under immediate pressure to alleviate German Jews for whom he sent in June 1945 a special investigation committee under the supervision of Earl G. Harrison from the University of Pennsylvania. He recommended admitting 100,000 Jews to Palestine, although many of them favored Western countries (56). The ultimate goal of Truman from such investigation was to convince Britain to abrogate the immigration restrictions of the 1939-White Paper. Truman's policy toward Palestine was not only affected by Nazi-Jewish relations, American Jewish influence, pro-Zionist advisors or congressmen and Jewish votes, but also, by apathy or ignorance of the Palestinian national aspirations in favor of implementing the Balfour Declaration as a promise (57).

The Harrison investigation strengthened the power of Congress to put heavy pressure on Truman to create a Jewish state in Palestine, mostly by German Jews. Three hundred and four legislators urged him

in July for free immigration to Palestine. In December 1945, the Congress stood behind the President by a resolution for colonizing Palestine by Jews (58). But the investigation also opened the way for the American-British cooperation on meeting the Zionist demand for political-economic colonization of Palestine with more immigrants. This was to be subtly handled lest it would raise the Arab hostility toward the West which was in competition with the Soviet Union. The US and Britain had to take the Arab factor into account in terms of affecting the global balance of power, but not reducing the American-British commitment to the Zionist colonial scheme in Palestine. This was apparent in the British Air Ministry advice to strategists arguing that the Arabs had to be convinced of the American-British separation of the Jewish problem in Europe from the Palestine issue, to maintain the Arab good will. Similarly, the American Joint Chiefs of Staff warned Truman against Western actions in Palestine that would push the Arabs into the Soviet camp (59). Tactical military considerations and not a long-term policy goal in Palestine was behind the American-British attempts to avoid the Arab opposition However, this proved detrimental to Western interests later on especially in terms of forcing Arabs to seek Soviet support.

Maintaining the Arab trust and good will went hand in hand with carrying on a pro-Zionist policy to expedite the US and Britain to enquire in the conditions of Palestine for Jewish immigration. The first joint commission of inquiry was set up in late 1945 as first, the outcome of an American pressure on Britain for a high number of Jewish immigrants into Palestine, and second, as a British acceptance of wider American participation in transferring them there, as a prelude to ending the conflict. The American pressure was put in a statement by Truman Saying: "…if Palestine could only take some refugees from Europe to relieve the pressure, it would alleviate for the time being the situation in Europe, and it might satisfy some of the demands of the "humanitarian" Zionists and give us an opportunity to turn our attention to a permanent solution of the political problem" (60). While the British acceptance appeared in the cabinet tendency toward a solution of trusteeship which

"will naturally depend largely on the recommendation of the [Anglo-American] committee... and the United States will thus be placed in the position of sharing the responsibility for the policy which she advocates. She will no longer be able to play the part of irresponsible critic," (61). The two statements explicitly showed the common agreement of the American and British governments about their short-term and long-term planning regarding Palestine. The Zionist interests were their first priority without due consideration to the Palestinian national aspiration.

The American-British Committee of Inquiry was set up in November 1945 and published its report in April 1946 (62). Unlike the Congress wanting from the Inquiry free immigration to Palestine, the State Department and the British Foreign Office, looked at it, as a tool of avoiding an immediate end of the conflict, but Truman and Attlee expected it to offer them a prompt policy guideline for Jewish immigration. The inquiry had the mission of meeting such expectation and in the final report it satisfied Truman's demand of immediately, bringing to Palestine 100,000 German Jews. Besides, it recommended not to partition Palestine, but to continue the mandate according to Balfour Declaration until it was replaced by a UN trusteeship.

With various degrees, Truman and Attlee accepted the joint inquiry recommendations to guide their common policy on Palestine. Admitting 100,000 Jews was considered a legitimate concern of the US and Britain. The inquiry was a source of happiness for Truman in "endorsing his policy of immigration" and Attlee for "involving the US in shouldering the burden of Palestine" (63). Obviously, the US was being heavily drawn alongside Britain in sustaining the Zionist claim for a Jewish national home in Palestine. The inquiry also changed Britain's plan of working for regional Arab-Jewish autonomy (64).

The Zionists mostly accepted admitting 100,000 immigrants as it fitted their plan of changing the demographic balance of Palestine, but rejected the rest of inquiry recommendations. Especially, it was the idea of the American Jewish Committee to favor, for tactical reason, the human factor over the political. While other Zionist organizations held reservation on the inquiries, among them, the American Jewish

Conference, the American Zionist Emergency Council saying that the report did not go enough in meeting the Zionist demands (65).

By drawing special attention to the Jewish refugees, the American-Anglo inquiry encouraged the Zionists to embark on a wide campaign of terror against the Palestinian people for political gains. The Jewish Agency under Ben-Gurion was already engaged in terrorism since the late 1945. This endangered the life and property of Palestinians and British alike. The most dangerous terrorist organizations were the Hagana and Stern whose unbending aim was to take Palestine by terrorism (66). Their operations incited fear among Palestinians who saw the British on the side of their enemy. There was a British failure in carrying their security duty toward the Palestinian society. In the name of fighting terrorism, the British authorities in Palestine began disarming Palestinians more strictly than Jews who had a secure political support in London. The lack of British determination in curbing the Zionist terror was shown by officers of the Colonial Office in the statement that "There are already signs that we will have political pressure to delay military action against the Jews" (67).

At the time of increasing Jewish terrorism for an imposed Zionist solution, the US and Britain were trying to get Arab support for admitting 100,000 Jews into Palestine, the Arabs rejected the report, as it would involve the US in creating a Jewish state in Palestine, which the American Joint Chiefs of Staff warned would bring the Soviet power into the Middle East. Truman remained adamant on bringing 100,000 immigrants, while claiming to the Arabs of continuing the Roosevelt policy of consulting with them before taking final decisions (68). On a lesser scale, the British, with American endorsement, continued admitting 1500 immigrants each month to meet the mandate requirements. The Arabs, especially, Ibn-Saud rejected any type of Jewish immigration lest help finally create a Jewish state in Palestine (69).

A Jewish state was made an irreversible process by the joint American-British inquiry against the Palestinian interest. The inquiry recommendation widened the horizons of the American-British

cooperation. It also strengthened the American hands as reflected in the Truman statement of April 30, 1946 "I am very happy that the request which I made for the immediate admission of 100,000 Jews into Palestine has been unanimously endorsed. I am also pleased that the committee recommends in effect the abrogation of the White Paper. In addition to these immediate objectives the report deals with many other questions of long range political policies" (70).

The core recommendation of 100,000 immigrants was to be carried through the new American-British Morrison-Grady plan of July 1946. The plan recommended transferring that number of immigrants in a year; in addition to partitioning Palestine into provincial autonomous Jewish and Arab parts under the British trusteeship (71). By the acknowledgement of the American co-chairman of the plan Henry F. Grady, it offered "… the only means now apparent of moving the 100,000 into Palestine in the near future. It is strongly backed by the British Government." He also said that "the Joint committee is unanimous in conviction that plan agreed to is the only realistic solution at this time particularly if any extensive Jewish immigration is to be realized" (72).

Although the plan was favorable to Truman's policy of supporting Zionism, congressmen and the Zionists put pressure on the President to reject the Morrison-Grady plan as not fulfilling to the Zionist demands. As affected by their search for Jewish votes, legislators among which were Senators Wagner and Taft expressed dissatisfaction with the plan and urged Truman to concentrate on moving Jews to Palestine. The Zionist leaders rejected the trusteeship idea but wanted free Jewish immigration to Palestine (73). Under such pressure and against the advice of the State Department, Truman on July 30, 1946 declared an opposition to the plan as an election tactic against his Republican opponent Thomas Dewey, who was competing against Truman for Jewish votes (74). Truman's compliance with the Zionist pressure reflected negatively on the American interests in the Arab World. Ibn-Saud considered Truman dishonest in supporting the Zionist aggression on Palestine at the expense of the Arab and Muslim friendship. The

American oil concessions were restricted to the Arab area. Truman found it necessary to placate the Arabs with the good Zionist intentions behind their scheme in Palestine (75). Ibn Saud criticized Truman's pro-Zionist policy and asked him to abide by Roosevelt letter of consulting with the Arabs on Palestine. Truman also agreed to release that letter as was the policy of his government (76).

Faced with the Arab and the Zionist rejection of the Morrison-Grady plan, on October 4, 1946, Truman sought a solution of the conflict through convincing the British of a partition acceptable to the Zionists in any future plan. It meant a compromise between the Morrison-Grady plan and a Jewish Agency proposal for a Jewish state in Palestine (77). This, he thought, was to be the goal of the London conference of September-October 1946 between the Arabs and the Zionists to achieve with the American support (78).

The London conference continued on and off from October 1946 to mid February 1947, considering the Morison-Grady plan with the Arab states attendance and without Palestinian, Zionist, or American participation. It failed as the Arabs unanimously rejected partitioning Palestine to Arab and Jewish provinces (79). The failure of the conference led to speedy US-British cooperation with regard to submitting the Palestinian problem to the UN. Since February 1947, their UN representatives began collaborating in requesting the World organization to discuss the Palestinian problem in September 1947 (80).

The two countries thus worked closely in spite of some disagreements on methods, not goals, to help the Zionists get established in Palestine. All along, the US joined Britain in organizing inquiry committees to legitimize the Jewish immigration to reach a majority in Palestine. The Zionist pressures on the US government and the Jewish terrorism in Palestine were moving forces behind the American-British decisions to take a pro-Zionist stand. The American Congress directed an already pro-Zionist President, in the direction of the British Colonial Office idea of partitioning Palestine against the advice of the State Department and the British Foreign Office. The Arab States were misled by protracted negotiations with American and British officials, ending

with the loss of time to their enemy. The Palestinians were excluded from the process of negotiations as if they naturally did not exist. The fate of their country was yet to be decided by the UN under the influence of the US and Britain with a majority support in that organization. In particular, the US monopolized its dominance in the UN to win support for the Zionist case. In the next part, we will discuss the special role that the US was determined to play in partitioning Palestine, leading to creating Israel and the Palestinian dispersion in 1948.

American Determination to Create Zionist State in Palestine Leading to Palestinian Catastrophe in 1948.

The Palestinian conflict reached a high tension point toward the end of the 1940s during the growing American dominance of the World arena against the Soviet Union. At the same time Britain was weakened to become a second status power behind the two competing superpowers. The US inherited the defense of British imperial interests which became vulnerable to the Soviet penetration especially in the Eastern Mediterranean and the European south. The Arab area, including Palestine, was covered by the American global strategy. This meant that the US was working to contain the expanding Soviet power against the traditional Western interests in the Middle East. This interventionist policy was put formally by President Truman on March 12, 1947, in a doctrine of cold war against the Soviet Union and their allies. In his doctrine, Truman said "I believe it must be the policy of the United States to support free peoples who resist attempted subjugation by armed minorities or by outside pressure" (81). This was the essence of continuation against the Soviet Union as a primary goal of the US, which directly affected American policy toward Palestine. After the UN partition resolution was passed in November 1947, pro-Zionist voices in the Truman administration like Herschel Johnson of the American UN team called for applying Truman's doctrine to a Jewish state in Palestine. It was agreed that America would defend such a state by all means without permission from the UN and the Soviet Union as an American Interest (82).

Containment of the Soviet Union constituted the background of the White House decisions on the Palestinian issue. With Britain being unable to continue ruling Palestine as it was expressed officially by its representative at the UN on May 9, 1947 the US became determined to take on a leadership role in finalizing the fate of Palestine at the UN. For this purpose, Truman played a special part in organizing a UN special Committee on Palestine (UNSCOP) from countries of pro-Western policy, and with much less Soviet and Arab influence in it. Palestinians and other Arabs boycotted that committee, expecting it to recommend partition as the Zionists wanted (83). By August 31, 1947, the UN special committee reported its majority and minority recommendations for Palestine. The majority plan supported by Canada, Peru, Czechoslovakia, Guatemala, Netherlands, Sweden and Uruguay with the abstention of (Australia), which neither supported the minority plan nor that of the majority, partitioned Palestine to three states, Jewish, Arab and Jerusalem internationalized, with economic union under a British administration for a two-year transitional period, through which 150,000 Jewish immigrants entered the Jewish state. Strangely, the Jewish state had 498000 Jews and 407000-497000 Arabs. While the minority plan of India, Iran and Yugoslavia suggested federation of the Arab and Jewish states after three years under the UN authority. This authority would determine the Jewish immigration, which then, would be regulated by the federal government. Both plans meant partitioning Palestine, a principle which the US supported, especially as it came in the majority plan which was consistent with the Balfour Declaration (84).

The majority plan for partition was exploited by the US as an international disguise to achieve a Jewish state against the will of the Palestine/Arab side, which stood for a complete independence of Palestine. The US was helped in this direction by a conniving British government to partition Palestine in pursuance to its mandate aim of creating a Jewish political structure deemed by the Balfour Declaration. However, Britain showed initial neutrality on partition, thus becoming a party to its enforcement which would anger the Arabs. Britain's position was summed up by R. M. Wright, from the Eastern Department,

responding to an inquiry "… that in the Foreign Office view, HMG [His Majesty Government] could not oppose any decision of the General Assembly, but on the question of assuming responsibility for such a decision, the position was very different" (85).   The intention of Britain was to leave Palestine in the UN hold under the US leadership and to leave without any international commitment.   The US was further supported in October 1947 by Sweden in introducing a joint resolution to the UN Palestine Committee, urging it to approve the majority plan for solving the Arab-Jewish conflict.   Even the Soviet help was enlisted for partitioning Palestine and ending the British mandate on May 1, 1948; also establishing a UN commission to rule Palestine in a transitional period before setting up the Arab and Jewish states (86).

American efforts to collect international support for partitioning Palestine met the Zionist political aim and were largely supported by the American Zionist organizations.   The Zionists promptly asked America to go for a Jewish state, though knowing, that this would harm American interests in the Arab World.   Neither did they abstain from asking the Soviet Union for serving pure Jewish interests, as distinguished from those of America (87).   Thus, the American-Soviet relations were manipulated to create a common front with the Zionists against the Palestinian Arab interests.

The Palestine Arab Higher Committee decried the US pro-Zionist stand on partition as an imperialist act.   It said "The United States is conspiring with the Zionists against the Arabs for pure imperialist purposes utilizing the Jewish problem as a screen behind which to hide this conspiracy" (88). Meanwhile, Arab states spoke strongly of suffering Arab-American interests if a Jewish state was to be established.

The deteriorating Arab-American relations were largely attributable to a determined America, siding with Zionism after the UN report on partition of Palestine. Truman ordered the State Department, though opposed to work toward the partition of Palestine at the UN.   In September 1947, the Secretary of State, George C. Marshall, asked the General Assembly to endorse partition.   Likewise, Truman and the undersecretary of State, Robert A. Lovett, began circulating their support

for partition. On October 11, 1947, the UN Ambassador, Johnson, spoke at the General Assembly in support of the partition and the Jewish immigration. A Jewish state after a temporary period had to be established in spite of the Arab reaction. All done in disregard to the Joint Chiefs of Staff position: that a Jewish state would endanger the American strategic and oil interests in the Arab World (89). This shows the extent to which it was dangerous for the US to antagonize the Arabs with partition to satisfy Zionist colonial ambitions in Palestine.

The US success in involving the international community in Palestine conflict reached a new height when a fateful vote was made by the UN in November 1947. First, on November 25, 1947, a vote was taken by the UN Special Committee of 25 votes in favor of partition, 13 against, and 17 abstentions. The two-third majority was not registered for the lack of one vote. Yet in November 29, 1947, under the US pressure, the General Assembly reached the two-third majority, by voting 33 for partition, 13 against, and 10 abstentions. After the indecisive voting in the special committee, the American government and private pressures were instrumental in forcing countries to endorse the partition resolution. By recognition of Truman, the White House was subjected to tense Zionist pressure unknown to him before. Also with admission of the Undersecretary of State, Lovett, and Loy Henderson, head of the State Department Near East Division, that the anti-partition State Department was never put under such pressure to work for approving the partition. As a result, countries moved for the partition, among them were China, France, Liberia, the Philippines and Haiti. Joined in the pressure, Congressmen like Cellar, J. H. McGrath and others, which affected Truman to stand for the partition. Simultaneously, Truman was under the pressure of public citizens, like Court Justice Murphy and Frankfurter, his adviser David Niles and General John Hildring in the UN mission; besides the Zionist figures, like Silver, Neuman, Weisman and David Horowitz; all urging him to stand for the partition. Even big companies like Firestone Rubber Company had a hand in convincing states, as Liberia to be on the side of partition (90). In fact, the combined American pressure turned the UN partition to an internationally endorsed

American project with dangerous ramifications to American interests. The danger was seen by the State Department whose knowledgeable figure Henderson warned that "The policy we are following in New York at the present time, is contrary to the interests of the United States and will eventually involve us in international difficulties, of so grave a character, that the reaction throughout the world…will be very strong" (91).

The State Department disapproval of the partition was in line with the UN Charter forbidding to curve up countries by the mandatory power or the UN itself. Article 2 (7) of the UN and article 22 of the League of Nations of separating territories from Turkey, recognized the jurisdiction of Palestine as a separate country. The Palestinian people who were a majority were entitled to self-determination (92). This principle was broken by partitioning Palestine instead of transferring it to independence under the UN trusteeship. The articles 75-85 in chapter 2, explained the application of the trusteeship system under the General Assembly supervision, which was not done in the case of Palestine. The UN applied its article 96 of consulting the International Court of Justice for an advice on the independence of Palestine. Instead, the UN allowed itself to be manipulated by major political powers at the expense of the Palestinian people who rejected the illegal UN partition (93).

The State Department disapproval of partition meant its failure to stop it. This instigated it to recommend to the unbending White House a temporary trusteeship in light of the war between the Arabs and Jews following the November partition. It estimated that the partition was not a final settlement but was a recommendation for peace. However, the Secretary of State, Marshall, was allowed to work on the new course of trusteeship with the condition of not reversing Truman's pro-Zionist policy. With this political uncertainty, the American UN representative, Warren A. Austin, proposed at the Security Council on February 24, and March 19, 1948, the trusteeship on Palestine, without prejudicing a final solution to the conflict. Truman criticized the timing of the State Department proposal arguing that it should have waited until the Security Council found partition impossible to apply. It also assured the Zionists,

like Weisman, of its temporary nature, knowing that it will not work in light of the realities of war in Palestine, and the lack of the American troops to enforce it.   Truman's anti-trusteeship stand was actually affected by his election considerations, which his Zionist adviser, Clark Clifford, and David Niles, manipulated for recognizing the partition in return for the Jewish votes (94).

The trusteeship proposal did not mean a change of mind to Truman, but a tactic to gain more time for the partition.   It aimed in Truman's view, at creating temporary conditions to end the conflict. On March 25, 1948, he said that " Trusteeship is not a substitute for the partition plan, but as an effort to fill the vacuum, soon to be created by the termination of the mandate of May 15" (95).   Obviously, the trusteeship did not constitute an alternative policy deserving his attention, and thus was bound to fail.

Not only the trusteeship scheme did not have Presidential faith in it, but it lacked the international muscle to enforce it. By mere proposing it at the UN, was no guarantee of success, for it received a little international backing, as it was opposed, when put to discussion at the General Assembly on April 16, 1948.   Countries refused to contribute forces, while the war was virtually partitioning Palestine. The trusteeship reached a low point on April 28, 1948, when the US put an emergency proposal of which the General Assembly would accept the status quo, pending a final decision in September 1948.   Again, UN-member countries did not supply force to implement it.   The trusteeship was weakened further by a British proposal at the UN on May 3, 1948 of establishing "neutral authority" to administer Palestine, and a final solution was to be reached after stopping the fight.   More weakening of the trusteeship was when the US proposed on May 13, 1948 at the UN, to appoint a "High Commissioner" changed to "Mediator" to administer Palestine, until peace was reached in Palestine without specifying the political solution (96).

The state Department's trusteeship scheme failed at the UN for the lack of Truman's political support, and his dedication for partitioning Palestine to create a Jewish state.   The trusteeship concept was rather

used by him as a time-wasting device for the Arabs, while enabling Jews to hold on to their territorial gains made after the partition resolution. His determined stand for Zionism led to its ultimate victory with the proclamation of Israel at the end of the mandate at 6 P.M. on May 14, 1948. In competition with the Soviets, Truman was the first to recognize it de facto within ten minutes of its being. The recognition said "This Government has been informed that a Jewish state has been proclaimed in Palestine and recognition has been requested by the provisional government thereof. The United States recognizes the provisional government as the de facto authority of the new state of Israel," (97).

Recognition was followed by announcing the exchange of representatives on June 22, 1948, by appointing the pro-Zionist James G. McDonald to Israel, and Eliahu Epstein of Israel to the US. It was appropriate to say, that upon the recognition and diplomatic exchange, Truman and the State Department did not see eye to eye. Nonetheless, the President forced his own determination as the dominant national figure in charge of making foreign policy. The same determination prevailed in extending a full-recognition of Israel in January 1949, and making it a UN member in May of the same year (98). It was noticed that the American full recognition was done in contradiction to international diplomatic traditions as the State Department said. The American recognition of Jordan on August 30 1948 was seen as a precedent to be followed by fully recognizing Israel (99). Truman, however, expedited his recognition and sent promptly in June 1948 a pro-Zionist ambassador in competition with the Soviet Union, who tried to utilize Zionist socialists as the vanguard of Soviet power in the region. Ambassador McDonald informed his government of the necessity of quick American support to Israelis believing in Western values in the face of Soviet manipulation of Israeli politics, which led finally to American financial aid (100). The Israeli leadership, Kamil Mansur argued, was surprised by the Soviet support for the partition and was aware of the Soviet manipulation of Israeli politics for tactical reasons to kick the British out of the region. Furthermore, Israeli socialists were not

part of Soviet international socialism. It was in the Israeli interest to gain the support of both supper powers for its own existence (101).

Truman's actions were motivated by his election considerations regardless of their international implications. According to the New York Times, one of the major reasons for which Israel was speedily recognized, was to secure Jewish votes in the November election of 1948 (102). For the same reason, Truman endorsed Israel expansion at the expense of the UN proposed Palestinian state, assuring that he will not force Israel to abandon Palestinian lands as the UN mediator, Count Bernadott recommended for reaching peace on July 4, 1948. Bernadott called for returning the Negev and part of Galilee to the Palestinians; Israel was to be in union with Jordan; Jerusalem was to remain in Arab land; Haifa and Lydda were to become free outlets; and Jewish immigration was to be supervised by the union. The US did not stand for the Bernadott plan, more than considering it as a basis for discussion (103). Rejection of the Bernadott mediation was a symptom of greater violation of the international law and the Palestinian national rights.

Truman's recognition of Israel and its admission to the UN did not constitute a legal ground for its legitimacy. Most Palestinian Jews opposed Israel, as was proclaimed by Jewish immigrants whom only one third was legal of all Jews in Palestine. This removed the ground for the Jewish National Council to proclaim that Israel represented all Jews. Neither its co-author, the World Zionist Movement as a foreign entity had the right by internal Palestinian or international law to create Israel on a land it did not posses. Nor did the recognition of Israel's independence by other states make its existence legal, for it did not actually exist; for its constitution did not have the force of customary law to necessitate recognition. Israel's de facto and de jure recognition was not a source of legitimacy, for in the first case, it could be made regardless of its origin, and in the second, without reference to the legality of its recognized government. Such recognition did not eliminate the right of Palestinians to their lands. The UN could not legitimize Israel, since its admission did not depend on it being legitimate. Besides, its admission was conditioned upon accepting the UN resolutions on

Palestine, which it always ignored. Moreover, the lapse of time did not give Israel legitimacy since the Palestinians did not abandon their ownership of Palestine (104).

The break-up of the Palestinian people and the creation of Israel in 1948 were directly linked to Truman's pro-Zionist policy, defying the Palestinian sovereignty and the international legality. He persisted in his policy of standing for the Jewish claim on Palestine, in contradiction, to his own Department of State and defense officials, who maintained that it was not in American Middle East best interest to do so. But it was due to emotional considerations to transfer to Palestine German Jewish problems exploiting them for personal and party election considerations under the Zionist pressures, in order, to continue his predecessor's support policy of Zionism. Jewish money and votes moved the American Congress to his side against internal governmental opposition to his policy, and the British cooperation helped him overcome international difficulties to bring the Zionist scheme into reality. All State Department proposals, like the trusteeship plans, calling for equitable solution to the Palestinian–Zionist conflict, were allowed to fail by Truman continued disregard for the Palestinian national right with a solid Congressional support of his policy. The Truman-Congressional support of Zionism was aided by a colonial British policy, adopting the tactics of connivance, abstention and hand-off policy, to enable the US to meet the Zionist political demands in Palestine. This is why the US succeeded at the UN to partition Palestine in 1947, paving the way for the emergence of Israel in 1948, and helping it to reject the international calls for returning the Palestinians to their homes, and withdrawing from lands outside the Palestinian lines. In the next part, we will talk about the cumulative impact of the American material and political support of Israel, on the nature of the Palestinian catastrophe and the American national interests in the region.

The Cumulative Impact of American Policy on Nature and Scope of Palestinian Catastrophe and American Interests in the Middle East.

The illegal creation of Israel was accompanied by the American determination to arm Israel for maintaining its territorial gains. By May

15, 1948, Truman lifted the arms embargo forced in December 1947 to enable Israel to stand against the Palestinian-Arab resistance. His arms policy was largely shaped by the pressure of legislators, such as Representatives, Emanuel Cellar, John Vorys and Senators Irving M. Ives, Dennis Chavez, Edwin C. Johnson, Herbert R. D. Connor, Joseph C. O'mahoney and Owen Brewster: besides governors and mayors all asking for arming Israel under the pretext of self-defense. Also, the American arms were obtained by virtue of the special relations between Truman and Weisman, the newly appointed president of Israel. Weisman met Truman on May 25, 1948 and succeeded in getting tanks, planes, ammunition to be financed by an American loan of $100,000,000. Other American arms, money and volunteers were previously smuggled by the Zionists and their supporters through various means (105). American arms, money and volunteers were used in Jewish terrorist attacks on the Palestinians, incurring fear and death and causing their expulsion from their homeland.

The American military supplies to Israel were matched by the American pro-Israeli political activities at the UN. On May 17, 1948, the US invoked article 39 of the chapter VII of the UN Charter for a cease-fire in Palestine, calling the Arab military actions against Israel a threat to peace, which could require the imposition of economic actions and a declaration of war against them by the UN. The Arabs saw the US cease-fire proposal as a tool to gain the international legitimacy for the provisional government of Israel, an equal partner to Arab states in Palestinian affairs. With British cooperation, the US was able on May 29, 1948 to pass a UN resolution for a four-weak cease-fire, going into effect on June 1, 1948. At the end of the truce, the US on July 15, 1948 succeeded once again in passing a UN cease-fire resolution, by invoking article 39 as the basis of the May 29 resolution, to affirm the internationally recognized status of the provisional government of Israel. The truce between the Arabs and Jews was supervised by the UN mediator Bernadott, appointed by the Security Council on May 20, 1948 to cooperate with the truce commission of the US, Belgium and France (106). The American-arranged truce played a role in favor of Israel to

gain time for normalizing its international status and make it an inseparable part of the Middle Eastern scene. At the same time, such truce did not stop war, which Bernadott himself tried to do through his July 1948 initiative to no avail.

War in Palestine was the result of Israel's creation which was largely attributable to the American firm support. Hence the Arabs and Palestinians faced the inevitability of protecting their country against Zionism as an imperialist movement imposed on them by the force of arms. The new situation affected directly their national being. Their collective response was expressed on May 25, 1948, in a cable sent to the UN–Security Council, by the Arab League Secretary General, saying that the end of the mandate created a vacuum in Palestine threatening Arab peace and security, which required the Arab intervention to keep law and order there (107). Understandably, the Arab forces went in to help their Palestinian brothers against ongoing Jewish attacks since the partition of November 1947. Jewish organizations of the Hagana, Irgun and Stern were able to attack poorly prepared Palestinians, without Arab protection because of the British mandate. One Palestinian town after another was taken according to a well-organized D-plan made by the Hagana, to occupy as much of Palestine and evacuate its Palestinian inhabitants. In April 1948, Deir Yassin in Jerusalem was massacred to horrify other towns to flee for safety. Then Tiberias, Haifa, Jaffa and the Arab quarter in the new city of Jerusalem were taken, and followed in May by Beisan, Safed and Acre. Then the advantage in number of 60,000 to 80,000 Israeli soldiers versus 20,000 Arabs\Palestinians, and with better weapons, the Israelis in October 1948, breaking the UN truce occupied Beersheba, Beit Hanun, Bait Jibrin and the Western Galilee. In November 1948, they took the Negev, while in December took Al-Auja, and in March 1949 Umm Rashrash was taken to be renamed Eilat. The Arab-Israeli war was ended by Armistice agreements between Israel and Egypt in February 1949, with Lebanon in March, with Jordan in April and with Syria in July 1949 (108). These agreements replaced the truce of July 1948, which Israel violated continuously to grab more of the

Palestinian partition designated-area to create a fait accompli against any future peaceful settlement with the Palestinian people.

Terror and expulsion were the main Israeli methods of uprooting Palestinians from their country. Deir Yassin served the most egregious example of death, and Ramleh, Lydda, Safed were examples of expulsion. For terror, it reached its highest stage in mass killing of the people in Deir Yassin and other towns, foretelling Palestinians to face the same fate if they did not leave. The Israelis succeeded in using terror to play on the fear of the Palestinians to drive them into dispersion. While expulsion was used to complete the task of removing the Palestinians as was done in Haifa, Lydda, Ramleh, Tiberias, Safed, Beersheba and other places. The ultimate aim of Israeli terror and expulsion was to establish a Jewish state of no Palestinians in it. The reports of the Lieutenant-General E. L. M. Burns, Chief of Staff of the UN Truce Supervisor Organization in Palestine, and John H. Davis, Commissioner General of the UN-Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East, stood as witnesses to the Israeli systematic application of terror and expulsion against the Palestinians in a translation of the Zionist program in Palestine (109).

Forcing the Palestinian people out of their homes caught the attention of the UN-mediator Bernadette, who recommended their repatriation. His recommendation was the basis of the General Assembly resolution in 194 (III) on December 11, 1948, to repatriate and compensate Palestinians as a matter of right. Israel refused to abide by it and brought more Jews into Palestine to make the Palestinian return impossible. It also claimed that the Palestinians were to blame for leaving in response to Arab calls for doing so. Thus ignoring terror and violence used through its occupation of most Palestinian towns, which started long before the end of the mandate on May 14, 1948, causing the expulsion of 300,000 Palestinians. Furthermore, Israel blamed the Palestinians/Arabs for not accepting the partition, which the war against Israel enabled it to occupy most Palestine. In Israeli sense, as if Palestinians did not have the right to defend their country against Israeli terrorism, which was perfectly legitimate under the international law. However, Israel used the

partition as the basis of its existence, but it expanded by war to 80 percent of Palestine, exceeding the 56 percent given by the partition (110).

By the mid-1949, most Palestine was occupied by 700,000 Jews owning only 6 percent of it, and close to a one million Palestinians out of 1348,840 people were forced by Israel into dispersion. Those who remained under the Israeli rule were gradually disposed of their lands under various laws, such as the Absentee Property Law, Security Zones Law, Uncultivated Lands Law, Expropriation Law, Land Acquisition Law and the Limitation Law. The rest of Palestine as the West Bank and Gaza Strip were ruled by Jordan and Egypt respectively (111). This was the depth of the Palestinian catastrophe wrought by the Zionist Israel with unflinching American support, in violation of the Palestinian national self-determination and the international law. The international legality and justice were broken for the sake of the American global containment strategy against the Soviet Union in the post war era. The creation of Israel was seen as part of a Western front, including Arab countries, to contain communism in the Middle East. But it was an American self–defeating policy to support Israel and expect an Arab cooperation against the Soviet Union. In the words of a Middle Eastern scholar "The confrontation of incompatible American and Arab objectives that emerged from the Palestinian war inhibited and eventually defeated United States efforts to recruit the Arab states as militants, in its crusade against international communism" (112). Similarly, The Middle East analyst Richard Cattan saw the instability of the region unavoidable due to irreconcilable American and Arab interests, because of their opposing stand regarding Israel [113]. Truly, instability plagued the region by creating Israel in 1948, costing the American interests economically, politically and in human life.

The genesis of the political instability in the region was the American policy failure to recognize the native Palestinian people, as independent and sovereign. Instead, they were regarded during the mandate as a minority of some economic interests, without political identity, and furthermore, were considered after their dispersion, as refugees. Their

plight according to President Truman was to be mitigated by economic assistance through the UN, to resettle them in Arab countries, and not by political solution of the conflict. For this purpose, Gordon R. Clapp., chairman of the Board of the Tennessee Valley Authority was sent by the UN to study the economic resources of the region to absorb the Palestinian refugees. Also with American financial contributions, the UN established in December 1949 the Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees (UNRWA) to provide them with subsistence. The American aim of providing economic aid to Palestinians was to prevent the Soviet Union from exploiting their poverty. However, American officials, like the Assistant Secretary of State, George McGhee, warned of dire consequences for the US if the Palestine problem was not settled politically (114).

Neither dispersion, nor economic assistance, were enough reasons, to make Palestinians forget their political identity, and drop their aspirations for national independence in their own country. They never gave up the ownership of Palestine as the legal basis of their sovereignty. The political change brought by Zionism was of no legal ground, but arbitrary under the internal Palestinian and the international law. In the Roman law, like it is today, sovereignty is based on property of territory, which gave the legitimate title of state. While political sovereignty is the power of state over land and people in spite of its illegitimate origin. The League of Nations gave the Arab territories separated from Turkey, among which, was Palestine, the right for independence, as it came in the article 22 of its Covenant. Moreover, the article 16 of the Treaty of Lausanne, of July 1923, between Turkey and the Allied powers, recognized the Arab sovereignty over their territories. The British mandate had sovereignty over Palestine, since the mandate could not dispose of the mandated territory, and sovereignty lied with the mandated Palestinians. In view of international legalists, since Palestine was classified in the category of 'A' mandated territory, it was very close to sovereignty and was provisionally independent. The temporary delay of exercising the Palestinian sovereignty, because of the mandate, did not deprive the Palestinians of their sovereignty; but maintained sovereignty

under the principle of self-determination advocated by the UN. By virtue of the international law and their ownership of Palestine, they were legally entitled to their national sovereignty, which the emergence of Israel at the end of the mandate in 1948, did not take away (115).

The Truman material and political support was vital in creating and expanding Israel to most of Palestine. His controversial recognition of Israel gave it political protection to pursue terror and expulsion against the Palestinian people, in violation of the international law. Israel's practice of violence and its birth as a result of it was enough reason to consider it a pariah state. Its illegal creation was the antithesis of the Palestinian national sovereignty derived from the Palestinian aged-long ownership of Palestine. The Palestinian people did not choose to leave their country on Arab calls as Israel always insinuated with the American connivance. But also, the US paid dearly in creating a hostile environment in the Arab side, which prevented the normal promotion of its national interests in the region and endangered the World peace.

Results

The Research has analyzed the US policy role, before, through, and after the Second World War of 1939, in helping Zionism establish Israel as a Jewish state, and causing the Palestinian catastrophe in 1984-49. This was a result of pursuing in Palestine, like any other European power, an imperialist policy in the name of protecting its national interests in the Middle East region. The US, like Britain, looked at Zionism, as a Western movement, which deserved its political and economic aid, to transform the 1917-Balfour Declaration into reality, in the face of unbending Palestinian-Arab resistance, to such a grave event to their independence and security. In fact, that declaration of Britain, and the American insistence of realizing it, laid the seeds of an endless conflict which plagued Arab and American interests, without ever having the capacity of settling it, but, remaining an ash in the fire to blow, at any sudden moment, like it has over the years, to endanger various American cultural, economic, political and strategic interests and shatter the World peace. The American-British-Zionist creation of the Palestinian conflict

has become a festering wound, which has never stopped the Palestinians, Arabs and Muslims to polarize against the West. The existence of Israel is the contradiction of the Palestinian existence, a paradox that created a self-perpetuated instability for Arab and American interests in the Middle East.

Although Britain was the dominant political force in Palestine, the US was gradually matching it on each political development in favor of Zionism. President Wilson supported the Balfour declaration in 1917 and its integration into the League of Nations mandate in 1919. The Congress endorsed the mandate in 1922, and also, in the 1924 agreement with Britain, and refused limiting the Jewish immigration and land purchase recommended by the White Papers of 1930 and 1939. It also adopted the British 1937 Peel partition plan of Palestine. The idea of partition became more appealing to the US during and after the war, which brought the Zionists closer to their goal of a Jewish state. The Congress supported partition three times in the war, in 1942, 1943 and 1944, while president Roosevelt tried to convince the Soviet Premier, Joseph Stalin at Yalta conference in 1945 of partition. Yet, Roosevelt was careful not to publicly push the partition idea on the Arabs lest provoke them, while he needed their strategic assets and oil assets in the war against Germany, especially after the defeat of France. To keep the Saudi oil flowing for the American navy, he met the Saudi king Ibn Abd Alazis in Egypt in 1942, and promised to provide consultation regarding Palestine after the war, however, he failed to get the king's support for the Zionist project.

With the US becoming the World's dominant power after the war in 1945, the Zionist state became closer to being established in Palestine. Following in the foot steps of his predecessor, President Truman took aggressive initiatives and collaborated with Britain to accommodate the Zionist demands of Jewish immigration and partition of Palestine. His-sponsored Harrison investigation of June 1945, recommended allowing 100,000 German Jews to Palestine, which was supported by the inquiry of November 1945 and the Morrison-Grady plan of July 1946. The Zionists accepted the immigration of 100,000, while rejected

continuation of the mandate, as it came in the joint American-British inquiry of November 1945, and also opposed provincial autonomous Jewish and Arab states under a British trusteeship as recommended by the Morrison-Grady plan. The three moves were completely rejected by the Palestinians as a foreign conspiracy against their country, which underwent a maximum investigation through the London conference of October 1946- February 1947. The failure of this conference, which neither Palestinians, nor Zionists attended, gave the US and Britain an excuse to force on the Palestinians a UN solution of partitioning Palestine.

The adoption of partition was the product of a deeper American involvement, and a gradual British retreat from Palestine, which at the same time, encouraged Jewish terrorism against the Palestinians without protection under the mandate. For election considerations and Congressional pressures, Truman pursued the partition which the State and War Departments warned would push the Arabs into the Soviet camp. But, he was determined to impose the Zionist inspired-partition project as Britain was relinquishing responsibility toward Palestine. This was achievable by monopolizing the Palestinian affairs as part of the American drive for global dominance against the Soviet Union. To this end, Truman organized the (UNSCOP) from pro-Western countries, with little Soviet and Arab influence on it, to work for partitioning Palestine along Zionist-American lines. It recommended partition as a principle which became through the American pressure the basis of the notorious UN General Assembly partition resolution of November 29, 1947, giving 56% of Palestine to a Jewish state and 40% to an Arab state. This resolution received also Britain's support to absolve itself of the mandate responsibility, and create a Jewish state as a concrete embodiment of the Balfour Declaration, which the US by that resolution turned into reality.

The Zionists played a hand in passing the partition resolution. Influential figures, like Silver, Neuman, Weisman, Horowitz and Niles had direct contacts to Truman. Also supporters of Zionism in government, as the Court Justices Murphy and Frankfurter with General Hildring of the UN mission, were of great impact on Truman's policy.

Even big business like the Firestone Rubber Company intervened with the UN resolution by convincing Liberia to vote for the partition. So many important persons in society and government weighed heavily on Truman's policy to pursue partition to create a Jewish state.

Partition was rejected by the Palestinians, Arabs and the State Department. The Palestinians denounced it as an imperialist act under the name of helping Jews; while the Arabs saw it unacceptable and a recipe for deteriorating American-Arab relations. The State Department looked at partition as threatening to American interests and against the international law. Article 2 (7) of the UN and article 22 of the League of Nations, recognized the jurisdiction of Palestine as a separate country, which the mandated country (Britain) had no right to divide. Also the UN articles 75-85 in chapter 2, which recommended a trusteeship system under the General Assembly supervision, were not applied to Palestine; nor did they apply article 96 of consulting the International Court of Justice over the independence of Palestine. Hence, it was sought by the State Department to replace the illegal partition with a UN trusteeship, acceptable to the Palestinian/Arab side, in order to, enhance the American interests in the region.

The State Department considered partition only a recommendation for peace, not a final settlement against Truman, who wanted partition to be permanent. To him, the trusteeship was a temporary measure and an extension to partition, which war in Palestine, made it a reality and was not to be changed by a trusteeship. This is why the State Department attempted to stop partition through trusteeship at the UN, but failed repeatedly on February 24, March 19, April 16 and May 13, 1948. Truman worked with the Zionists, Weisman and his personal advisors, Clifford and Niles, against the trusteeship, again in return, for Jewish votes. The US was not prepared to enforce it, nor was Britain, which further insisted that a solution to Palestinian conflict should await a cease-fire, which meant giving the Jews an opportunity to occupy much land.

By May 14, 1948, Israel proclaimed independence, on most of Palestine, to be first recognized by Truman, who helped it also become a

member state of the UN in May 1949. His actions were taken as a reward for the Jewish votes and as a result of the alliance with Zionism despite the fact that they were in violation of the Palestinian and the international laws. Only one third of the Jews in Palestine were legal and many did not support Zionism. Besides, Palestinians were the majority in ownership of Palestine. Moreover, Israel did not actually exist before. It was neither recognized, nor was the recognition of its admission to the UN sufficient to give it legitimacy, although this was done under the condition that it would comply with the UN resolutions which it always ignored.

Israel's rejection of the UN resolutions like its illegal creation by partition, were directly instigated by the American material and political support of Zionism, with the end-result of destroying the Palestinian people throughout 1948-49.   On May 15 and May 25, 1948 and with Congressional support, Truman allowed American arms shipments, and loaned Israel $100,000,000 to strengthen its military forces of 80,000 against 20,000 Palestinian/Arab forces, who were defending Palestine against the Jewish terrorism, widely practiced since 1945, by the Hagana, Irgun and Stern. Of military significance also, were the American diplomatic steps taken at the UN to give Israel extra time for defensive and offensive operations. The ceasefire-line of May 29 and July 15, 1948, jointly arranged with Britain, gave Israel a golden opportunity to complete implementing its military D-plan of occupying much of Palestine, and driving the Palestinians out of it. The two main methods of carrying out the D-plan were terror and expulsion against the Palestinians. In April 1948, Deir Yassin in Jerusalem was massacred jointly by the Hagana and Irgun, to serve as an example of terror for Palestinians to leave their towns or face the same fate. With the reputation for terror, Israeli forces attacked Tiberias, Haifa, Jaffa and the Arab quarter in the new Jerusalem, to be followed in May by Beisan, Safed, Acre; in October by Beersheba, Beit Hanun, Beit Jibrin and Western Galilea; in November by the Negev; in December by Al-Auja; and in March 1949 by Umm Rashrash (Eilat). By Summer 1949 after reaching armistice agreements with Arab countries, Israel occupied 80%

of Palestine and expelled one million out of 1348 Palestinians, owning 94% to be taken by 700,000 Jews, owning only 6% of it. The UN Truce Supervisor General Burns and Commissioner-General of Palestine Relief Davis testified that the Israeli terror and expulsion were a concrete translation of the Zionist program in Palestine. But they forgot to state the direct role of the US in cooperation with Britain in inflicting untold psychological pain and material loss on the Palestinians from beginning to end.

Israel never allowed the Palestinians to return, according to the UN 194 (III) resolution of December 11, 1948, recommending their repatriation or compensation as a matter of right. The US did not apply the UN principles to their return or to Israel's return to partition borders; instead, it considered the Palestinians as refugees in need for economic assistance, to which it established the UNRWA and the Clapp economic project of resettling them in Arab countries. Denying Palestinians their national right was the genesis of the political instability, plaguing the Middle East by putting it at the heart of the cold war, to threaten the World peace endlessly. American and Arab interests were brought into conflict, which the Soviet Union greatly exploited. More Arabs including Palestinians saw common interests with the Soviet Union against America which was seen as an imperialist power, protecting Israel as an imperialist tool. This was the political price the US paid for not politically dealing with the Palestinian problem, which the American Assistant Secretary of State, G. McGhee urged the US to do.

In spite of the American disregard for their national right and Israeli occupation of their lands, the Palestinian people held on to their national identity, as independent, but remaining united in their feeling with the Arab nation. The Palestinian independence was guaranteed by article 22 of the League of Nations, as people separated from Turkey were classified as "A" mandated territories, deserving independence. Article 16 of the Lausanne Treaty of July 1923 recognized the Arab sovereignty and the UN support for self-determination. Backed by the international law, the Palestinian national right could not be negated by imposing the British Balfour Declaration of 1917 and the mandate of 1922 nor by

partitioning Palestine in 1947 and recognizing Israel in 1948; nor by the armistice agreements of 1949; nor by Israeli laws of dispossessing Palestinians like the Absentee Property Law, Security Zones Law, Uncultivated Lands Law, Expropriation law, land Acquisition Law and the Limitation Law.

The US was consistent in supporting Zionism, and like Britain, it was deceptive with the Palestinians and the Arabs through various policy plans. While it gave Zionism diplomatic, political, economic and military support, it offered the Palestinians and Arabs promises of consultation and it continued to conspire against them for the Zionist sake. The American political and social structures were manipulated by the Zionists and their supports to uphold the Zionist-British colonial scheme in Palestine, plunging it in bloodshed. By policy and actions, it was firmly evident that the US had a direct role in creating the Palestinian catastrophe of 1948-49, plaguing Palestine and the Middle East with an ever-expanding political instability, which deprived American national interests and the World peace of normal conditions of growth throughout the twentieth century and beyond.

Conclusion

1. The US exploited the Zionist ambition for a Jewish state and the Palestinian drive for independence from the British mandate to inherit Britain in dominating the Middle East region with its vast natural resources in the face of an expanding Soviet Union.

2. The Zionist movement was of the same origin, tools and goals like those of the American-British imperialism. This has enabled it to win their support against weak Palestinians, without equal political, economic and military support given by the Arab countries, who were weak as well.

3. Being the World's most powerful nation, the US pressured Britain to open Palestine for Jewish immigration and land purchase, thus exploiting the war conditions and the Nazi anti-Jewish activities.

4. Through their presence in the executive and legislative decision-making process, as well as in places of power in society, the Zionist lobby put the Jewish interest for a state above that of the US with the Arabs,

5. The US used its World dominance to skew the international law to serve the Zionist interest and to reduce the Palestinian right to a minimum like it did with the partition of Palestine in 1947.

6. The political right could not be advanced without sustainable military power which the Zionists had and the Palestinians lacked as a result of the Zionist victory and the Palestinian-Arab defeat in 1948-49.

7. For the political right to be realized, it needed to be articulated by a well-versed national leadership characterized by a future vision and experience in the game of nations. The Palestinians did not have that leadership, while the Zionists had it.

8. The United Nations represented by the League of Nations failed in Palestine to apply the principles of justice upon which they were founded.

9. The regional and the international prevailing conditions in the 1930s and 1940s, in which the West was dominant made the loss of Palestine irreversible.

10. The Palestinian catastrophe, following the creation of a Zionist state in 1948, brought endless bloodshed and a hostile environment which impeded a natural growth of American interests with the Arabs and to the Zionists becoming able to drive a wedge between the Arabs and the US so as to continue thriving on their contradictions.

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